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Abstract: Humans depend massively on communication with others, but this leaves 
them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. We claim 
that humans have a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance to ensure 
that communication remains advantageous despite this risk. Here we outline this 
claim and consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental 
and social life by surveying issues, research and theories in different domains of 
philosophy, linguistics, cognitive psychology and the social sciences. 
 
1. Introduction 
We claim that humans have a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, 
targeted at the risk of being misinformed by others. Here we present this claim and 
consider some of the ways in which epistemic vigilance works in mental and social 
life. Our aim is to integrate into a coherent topic for further research a wide range of 
assumptions developed elsewhere by ourselves or others, rather than to present 
detailed arguments for each. 
Humans are exceptional among animals for both the richness and strength of 
their cognitive abilities and the extent to which they rely on a wide variety of 
information communicated by others. These two traits are linked. On the one hand, it 
would not be possible to rely so heavily on rich communication in the absence of 
species-specific cognitive abilities, in particular language and advanced mindreading. 
On the other hand, these individual abilities would not develop or function properly 
in the absence of cognitive skills, conceptual tools, and background knowledge 
acquired from others. 
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How reliable are others as sources of information? In general, they are mistaken 
no more often than we are – after all, ‘we’ and ‘they’ refer to the same people – and 
they know things that we don’t know. So it should be advantageous to rely even 
blindly on the competence of others. Would it be more advantageous to modulate our 
trust by exercising some degree of vigilance towards the competence of others? That 
would depend on the cost and reliability of such vigilance. But in any case, the major 
problem posed by communicated information has to do not with the competence of 
others, but with their interests and their honesty. While the interests of others often 
overlap with our own, they rarely coincide with ours exactly. In a variety of situations, 
their interests are best served by misleading or deceiving us. It is because of the risk 
of deception that epistemic vigilance may be not merely advantageous but 
indispensable if communication itself is to remain advantageous. 
Most human communication is carried out intentionally and overtly: The 
communicator performs an action by which she not only conveys some information 
but also conveys that she is doing so intentionally (Grice, 1975; Sperber and Wilson, 
1995).1 For communication of this type to succeed, both communicator and addressee 
must cooperate by investing some effort: in the communicator’s case, the effort 
required to perform a communicative action, and in the addressee’s case, the effort 
required to attend to it and interpret it. Neither is likely to invest this effort without 
expecting some benefit in return. For the addressee, the normally expected benefit is 
to acquire some true and relevant information. For the communicator, it is to produce 
some intended effect in the addressee. To fulfil the addressee’s expectations, the 
communicator should do her best to communicate true information. To fulfil her own 
expectations, by contrast, she should choose to communicate the information most 
likely to produce the intended effect in the addressee, regardless of whether it is true 
or false.2  
                                                 
1 Such human communication is very different from the many forms of animal 
communication discussed by Dawkins and Krebs (1978) and Krebs and Dawkins 
(1984). However, some similar evolutionary considerations about costs and benefits 
to communicators and receivers are relevant to both cases. 
2 Note, however, that if equally desirable effects (including long-term effects on 
reputation) could be achieved by conveying either true or false information, it might 
be preferable to communicate true information, since this is generally easier to 
manage (see Paglieri and Woods In press, who develop this parsimony argument and 
draw stronger conclusions from it than we do). 
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There are situations where communicators would not stand to benefit from 
misleading their audience, for instance when teaching their own children or 
coordinating joint action.  However, humans communicate in a much wider variety of 
situations, with interlocutors whose interests quite often diverge from their own.  
People stand to gain immensely from communication with others, but this leaves 
them open to the risk of being accidentally or intentionally misinformed, which may 
reduce, cancel, or even reverse these gains. The fact that communication is so 
pervasive despite this risk suggests that people are able to calibrate their trust well 
enough to make it advantageous on average to both communicator and audience 
(Sperber, 2001; Bergstrom et al., 2006). For this to happen, the abilities for overt 
intentional communication and epistemic vigilance must have evolved together, and 
must also develop together and be put to use together. A disposition to be vigilant is 
likely to have evolved biologically alongside the ability to communicate in the way 
that humans do. Human social life (with some cultural variability) provides plenty of 
inputs relevant to the development of psychological mechanisms for epistemic 
vigilance. Moreover, interaction among epistemically vigilant agents is likely to 
generate not only psychological but also social vigilance mechanisms. Before 
examining a variety of these mechanisms, we consider some philosophical issues 
relevant to the study of epistemic vigilance. 
 
2. Epistemic Trust and Vigilance 
Trust is obviously an essential aspect of human interaction (and also an old 
philosophical topic – see Origgi, 2004, 2008a). What is less obvious is the claim that 
humans not only end up trusting one another much of the time, but are also trustful 
and willing to believe one another to start with, and withdraw this basic trust only in 
circumstances where they have special reasons to be mistrustful. Still, philosophers 
from Thomas Reid to Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan, and more recently psychologists 
such as Daniel Gilbert, have made this stronger claim, arguing that humans are 
fundamentally trustful, not to say gullible. In this section we discuss these 
philosophical and psychological claims and suggest that for trust to play the 
fundamental role it does, it has to be buttressed by active epistemic vigilance. 
In Classical epistemology, uncritical acceptance of the claims of others was seen as 
a failure to meet rationality requirements imposed on genuine knowledge. It did not 
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present the same warrants as clear and distinct ideas or sense impressions arrived at 
by oneself. According to John Locke, for instance, ‘The floating of other men's 
opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to 
be true’ (Locke, 1690, book I, ch. 3, sect. 23). Historically, this individualistic stance 
should be seen as a reaction against the pervasive role in Scholasticism of arguments 
from authority. It persists in contemporary epistemology, where a common view, 
described by Tony Coady (1992) as 'reductivist' and by Elisabeth Fricker (1995) as 
'reductionist', is that true beliefs acquired through testimony qualify as knowledge 
only if acceptance of the testimony is itself justified by other true beliefs acquired not 
through testimony but through perception or inference (see Fricker, 1995; Adler, 
2002; van Cleve, 2006). 
This reductionist view contrasts with an alternative ‘anti-reductionist’ approach 
which treats trust in testimony as intrinsically justified (Hardwig, 1985; Coady, 1992; 
Foley, 1994). According to Thomas Reid, who provided an early and influential 
articulation of this anti-reductionist view, humans not only trust what others tell 
them, but are also entitled to do so. They have been endowed by God with a 
disposition to speak the truth and a disposition to accept what other people tell them 
as true. Reid talks of two principles ‘that tally with each other,’ the Principle of 
Veracity and the Principle of Credulity (Reid, 1764, § 24). 
Modern defences of a Reidian epistemology appeal to the existence of natural 
language as material proof that principles of credulity and veracity are indeed in 
force. How could shared meanings in a public language ever have stabilised, were it 
not for the fact that most statements in such a language are true testimonials? 
According to Lewis (1969) and Davidson (1984) in particular, the very possibility of a 
common language presupposes a generally truthful use of speech. This can be used to 
provide an a priori justification for trust in testimony (see Coady, 1992). Thus, Tyler 
Burge argues that linguistic communication has a ‘purely preservative character:’ just 
as memory is a medium of content preservation within individuals, so language is a 
medium of content preservation across individuals. In his view, every act of 
communication implies a tacit commitment to an acceptance principle which entitles 
us to ‘accept as true something that is presented as true and that is intelligible [to us] 
unless there are stronger reasons not to do so’ (Burge, 1993, pp. 457-88). 
Approaching the issue from an evolutionary perspective, Ruth Millikan (1987) argues 
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that testimonial communication is a form of perception by proxy and, as such, is a 
direct source of knowledge which is no more in need of inferential justification than is 
knowledge gained from perception.3 
This debate between reductionism and anti-reductionism revolves around two 
distinct issues, one normative and the other descriptive. The normative issue has to 
do with the conditions in which a belief acquired through testimony qualifies as 
knowledge. The descriptive issue has to do with the cognitive and social practices 
involved in the production and acceptance of testimony. The two issues are explicitly 
linked in a ‘third way’ approach which assumes that our actual practices, which 
involve some degree of vigilance, are likely to be reasonable, and therefore at least 
indicative of what the norm should be (e.g. Adler, 2003, Fricker, 2006). 
The descriptive issue has recently been taken up in experimental psychology. In 
particular, work by Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues seems to show that our mental 
systems start by automatically accepting communicated information, before 
examining it and possibly rejecting it (Gilbert et al., 1990; Gilbert et al., 1993). This 
can be seen as weighing (from a descriptive rather than a normative point of view) in 
favour of an anti-reductionist approach to testimonial knowledge. In a representative 
experiment, participants were told that they would have to learn Hopi words. They 
were then presented with sentences such as ‘A Monishna is a star’, followed shortly by 
the signal TRUE or FALSE, to indicate the truth value of the preceding statement. In 
some cases, however, participants were distracted while processing the signal TRUE 
or FALSE. Later, they were given a recognition task in which the same statements 
about Hopi words were presented, and they had to judge whether they were true or 
false. The authors predicted that, if acceptance is automatic, as they hypothesised, 
then distracting participants from indications that the statement was false should 
lead them to remember it as true. The results confirmed this prediction.  
How compelling is Gilbert et al.’s evidence? Epistemic vigilance involves a 
processing cost which is likely to be kept to a bare minimum when the information 
communicated is of no possible relevance to oneself. So, for instance, if you happen to 
                                                 
3 Note that this anti-reductionist view, which treats testimony as a simple process 
of content transfer and interpreters as mere receivers of contents, largely ignores or 
denies the systematically context-dependent and constructive nature of 
comprehension, which has been well established in modern pragmatics. 
Bezuidenhout  (1998) argues against Burge on this basis, and Origgi and Sperber 
(2000) criticize Millikan on similar grounds. 
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hear a comment on the radio about a competition in some sport you neither know nor 
care about, you are unlikely to invest any extra energy in deciding whether or not to 
believe what you hear. If forced to guess whether it is true or false, you might guess 
that it is true. After all, it was not merely uttered but asserted. Guessing that it was 
false would amount to questioning the legitimacy of the assertion, and why should 
you bother in the circumstances? 
More recent experiments have highlighted the crucial role of relevance – or 
rather, irrelevance – in the materials used by Gilbert and his colleagues. Even if the 
participants could muster some interest for statements about the meaning of Hopi 
words (and there is nothing in either the experimental situation or the participants’ 
background knowledge which makes it likely that they would), the information that 
one of these statements (e.g. ‘A Monishna is a star’) is false would still be utterly 
irrelevant to them. From the knowledge that such a statement is false, nothing 
follows. With other statements, things may be different. If you had prior reasons for 
thinking that a certain statement was true, or if it described a normal state of affairs, 
it is easy to see how you might find it relevant to be told that it is false. For instance, it 
is easy to see how being told that ‘Patrick is a good father’ is false might have a wide 
range of stereotypical implications for you. And indeed, in experiments by Hasson, 
Simmons, and Todorov (2005) which were otherwise similar to Gilbert’s, when 
participants were presented with statements whose falsity had this kind of potential 
relevance, automatic acceptance was again no longer found. These results cast doubt 
on the import of experimental evidence which has been claimed to show that 
communicated information is automatically accepted (see also Bergstrom and Boyer, 
submitted; Richter et al., 2009).  
As noted above, philosophers and psychologists who argue that humans are 
fundamentally trustful do not deny that, when the circumstances seem to call for it, 
people take a critical stance towards communicated information, and may end up 
rejecting it. So defenders of this approach are not committed to denying that such a 
critical stance might exploit dedicated cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. 
Vigilance (unlike distrust) is not the opposite of trust; it is the opposite of blind trust 
(see also Yamagishi, 2001). Still, the philosophers and psychologists whose claims we 
have discussed in this section assume that even if people do not trust blindly, they at 
least have their eyes closed most of the time to the possibility of being misinformed. 
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In Gilbert’s terms, people are trustful ‘by default’ (Gilbert et al., 1990, p. 601) and are 
disposed to critically examine communicated information only when circumstances 
motivate them to do so. This leaves unanswered the question of how they might 
recognise such circumstances without being vigilant in the first place. 
Note too that the idea of default trust draws on an old-style Artificial Intelligence 
or sequential flow-chart view of cognition, where a mechanism is wholly inactive until 
its turn comes to do its job, which it then does fully and uninterrupted. An alternative 
possible view is that several mechanisms may work in parallel or in competition. For 
instance, it could be that any piece of communicative behaviour activates two distinct 
processes in the addressee: one geared to identifying the relevance of what is 
communicated on the assumption that it is trustworthy, and the other geared to 
assessing its trustworthiness. Either process might abort for lack of adequate input, 
or because one process inhibits the other, or as a result of distraction. More generally, 
acknowledging the paramount importance of trust in human communication need 
not lead to denying or downplaying the importance of epistemic vigilance. 
Here is an analogy which may help to clarify how epistemic trust can co-exist with 
epistemic vigilance, and indeed be buttressed by it. When we walk down a street 
through a crowd of people, many at very close quarters, there is a constant risk of 
inadvertent or even intentional collision. Still, we trust people in the street, and have 
no hesitation about walking among them. Nor is it just a matter of expecting others to 
take care while we ourselves walk carelessly. We monitor the trajectory of others, and 
keep an eye out for the occasional absentminded or aggressive individual, 
automatically adjusting our level of vigilance to the surroundings. Most of the time, it 
is low enough to be unconscious and not to detract, say, from the pleasure of a stroll, 
but it rises when the situation requires. Our mutual trust in the street is largely based 
on our mutual vigilance. Similarly, in communication, it is not that we can generally 
be trustful and therefore need to be vigilant only in rare and special circumstances. 
We could not be mutually trustful unless we were mutually vigilant. 
 
3. Comprehension and Acceptance 
Human communication is characterised, among other things, by the fact that 
communicators have two distinct goals: to be understood, and to make their audience 
think or act according to what is to be understood. Correspondingly, addressees can 
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understand a message without accepting it (whether or not there is a bias or tendency 
towards acceptance). 
Are comprehension and acceptance ever distinct processes in other animals? 
There is some limited suggestive evidence that they are. It has been experimentally 
established that vervet and rhesus monkeys do not act on an alarm call from an 
individual that has produced a series of false alarms calls in the past (Cheney and 
Seyfarth, 1990; Gouzoules et al., 1996). Interpreted anthropomorphically, this may 
seem to suggest that the monkeys understand the message, but do not accept it given 
the unreliability of the source. However, a more parsimonious explanation is that 
alarm calls from this unreliable individual are not interpreted and then rejected by its 
conspecifics, but are simply treated as mere noise, and therefore ignored. More 
generally, there is no strong evidence or argument for distinguishing comprehension 
from acceptance in non-human communication. (In any case, if it emerged that other 
social animals do exert some form of epistemic vigilance, this would enrich our 
understanding of their minds rather than impoverishing our understanding of our 
own.) 
Philosophers of language and pragmatic theorists in the tradition of Austin, Grice 
and Strawson have been particularly concerned with distinguishing comprehension 
from acceptance and considering the relations between them. Austin, for instance, 
distinguished ‘the securing of uptake’ (that is, ‘bringing about the understanding of 
the meaning and the force of the locution’) from a range of further cognitive or 
behavioural effects on an audience that he described as ‘perlocutionary’ (Austin, 1962, 
p. 116). 
Grice (1957) took the speaker’s intention to achieve a certain cognitive or 
behavioural effect that goes beyond the mere securing of uptake as the starting point 
for his analysis of ‘speaker’s meaning’:  
 
“[S] meant something by x” is (roughly) equivalent to “[S] intended the 
utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the 
recognition of this intention”. (Grice 1957/89: 220)  
 
This analysis, which went through a great many revisions and reformulations (e.g. 
Strawson, 1964; Grice, 1969; Searle, 1969; Schiffer, 1972), treats a speaker’s meaning 
as a complex mental state made up of several layered intentions, of which the most 
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deeply embedded is the intention to make the addressee think or act in a certain way. 
Beyond this basic intention are two higher-order intentions: that the addressee 
should recognise the basic intention, and that the addressee’s recognition of the basic 
intention should be at least part of his reason for fulfilling it. By recognising the basic 
intention (and thus fulfilling the speaker’s higher-order intention to have that basic 
intention recognised), the addressee will have understood the utterance, whether or 
not he goes on to fulfil the basic intention by producing the desired response. 
Following this suggestion about the relation between comprehension and 
acceptance, Sperber and Wilson (1995) build their inferential model of 
communication around the idea that speakers have both an informative intention 
and a communicative intention. In their framework, the communicator produces an 
utterance (or other ostensive stimulus), intending thereby:  
 
The informative intention: to inform the audience of something. 
The communicative intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative 
intention. 
 
Here, the informative intention corresponds to Grice’s basic-level intention to 
produce a certain response in an audience, and the communicative intention 
corresponds to Grice’s second-level intention to have this basic intention recognised. 
Notice that the communicative intention is itself a second-order informative 
intention, which is fulfilled once the first-order informative intention is recognised. If 
the addressee accepts the (epistemic or practical) authority of the communicator, 
recognition of the informative intention will lead to its fulfilment, and hence to the 
production of the appropriate cognitive or behavioural response. However, the 
communicative intention can be fulfilled without the corresponding informative 
intention being fulfilled: in other words, an audience can correctly understand an 
utterance without accepting or complying with what they have understood. 
Sperber and Wilson’s analysis of communication departs from Grice’s analysis of 
speaker’s meaning in two ways. They argue that only two hierarchically related 
informative intentions are involved, with the communicative intention being a 
higher-order intention to inform the audience of one’s lower level informative 
intention. They reject the idea that the communicator must have a third-level 
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intention that the addressee’s recognition of her informative intention should be at 
least part of his reason for fulfilling it. 
For Grice, this third-level intention is essential for distinguishing ‘meaning’ from 
‘showing’. If I show you that I have a seashell in my pocket, your reason for believing 
that I have a seashell in my pocket is that you have seen it there. If I tell you “I have a 
seashell in my pocket,” your reason for believing that I have a seashell in my pocket is 
that I have told you so. How does my telling you something give you a reason to 
believe it? By the very act of making an assertion, the communicator indicates that 
she is committing herself to providing the addressee with genuine information, and 
she intends his recognition of this commitment to give him a motive for accepting a 
content that he would not otherwise have sufficient reasons to accept. In other words, 
making an assertion typically involves claiming enough epistemic authority to expect 
epistemic trust from the addressee. Similarly, making a request typically involves 
claiming sufficient practical or moral authority to expect the addressee to comply 
with the request. 
But still, is the audience’s recognition that the speaker intends her utterance to 
elicit trust or compliance an intrinsic property of the communication of meaning? 
Grice himself drew attention to a relevant counter-example which he saw as 
presenting a problem for his analysis, although he simply mentioned it passing and 
did not offer any solution. When the communicator is producing a logical argument, 
she typically intends her audience to accept the conclusion of this argument not on 
her authority, but because it follows from the premises: 
 
Conclusion of argument: p, q, therefore r (from already stated premises): 
While U[tterer] intends that A[ddressee] should think that r, he does not 
expect (and so intend) A to reach a belief that r on the basis of U's intention 
that he should reach it. The premises, not trust in U, are supposed to do the 
work. (Grice 1969/1989, p. 107). 
 
 Despite the existence of such counter-examples, Grice thought he had compelling 
reasons to retain this third-level intention in his analysis of ‘speaker’s meaning’. 
Sperber and Wilson, on the other hand, were analysing not ‘meaning’ but 
‘communication’, and they argued that this involves a continuum of cases between 
‘meaning’ and ‘showing’ which makes the search for a sharp demarcation otiose. In 
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producing an explicit argument, for instance, the speaker both means and shows that 
her conclusion follows from her premises. Although Grice’s discussion of this 
example was inconclusive, it is relevant to the study of epistemic vigilance. It 
underscores the contrast between cases where a speaker intends the addressee to 
accept what she says because she is saying it, and those where she expects him to 
accept what she says because he recognises it as sound. We will shortly elaborate on 
this distinction between vigilance towards the source of communicated information 
and vigilance towards its content. 
Clearly, comprehension of the content communicated by an utterance is a 
precondition for its acceptance. However, it does not follow that the two processes 
occur sequentially. Indeed, it is generally assumed that considerations of acceptability 
play a crucial role in the comprehension process itself. We believe that they do, 
although not in the way commonly envisaged. As noted above, many philosophers 
have argued that for comprehension to be possible at all, most utterances should be 
acceptable as true when properly understood. According to Davidson, for instance, we 
must interpret an utterance ‘in a way that optimizes agreement’ and that reveals ‘a set 
of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standard (Davidson, 1984, p. 137). 
Such ‘interpretive charity’ implies an unwillingness to revise one’s own beliefs in the 
light of what others say. It is an a priori policy of trusting others to mean something 
true – but this is a niggardly form of trust, since it is left up to the interpreter to 
decide what is true (however, see Davidson, 1986 for a more nuanced picture). 
There is a difference between trusting a speaker because you interpret what she 
says so as to make it as believable to you as possible, and believing what you 
understand a speaker to say – even if it is incompatible with your own beliefs, which 
you may then have to revise – because you trust her to start with. In this latter case, 
interpretation is not guided by a presumption of truth, so what is it guided by? 
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995), it is guided by an expectation of relevance.  
Even when an utterance is in your own language, decoding its linguistic sense falls 
well short of uniquely determining its interpretation. The comprehension process 
takes this linguistic sense, together with contextual information, and aims for an 
interpretation consistent with the expectation of relevance that every utterance elicits 
about itself. According to relevance theory – we are simplifying here –, every 
utterance conveys a presumption that it is relevant enough to be worth the hearer’s 
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attention. The hearer does not have to accept this presumption: after all, the speaker 
may not know what is relevant to him, or she may not really care. But whether or not 
the hearer accepts the presumption of relevance, the very fact that it is conveyed is 
enough to guide the interpretation process. It justifies the search for an interpretation 
that the speaker had reason to think would seem relevant to the hearer. In many 
cases, the output of such a relevance-based interpretation process differs from the 
one that interpretive charity would select. 
To illustrate, suppose Barbara has asked Joan to bring a bottle of champagne to 
the dinner party: 
 
Andy (to Barbara): A bottle of champagne? But champagne is expensive! 
Barbara: Joan has money. 
 
Andy had previously assumed that Joan was just an underpaid junior academic. How 
should he interpret Barbara’s reply? If his aim was to optimize agreement, he should 
take Barbara to be asserting that Joan has some money, as opposed to no money at 
all, which is true of most people and which he already believes is true of Joan. But 
interpreted in this way, Barbara’s reply is not relevant enough to be worth Andy’s 
attention. By contrast, if he interprets ‘has money’ as intended to convey has enough 
money to be easily able to afford champagne Barbara’s utterance would be relevant 
enough. More precisely, it would be relevant enough to Andy provided that he 
believes it. If he does not believe what he takes Barbara to say, then her utterance will 
only provide him with information about Barbara herself (her beliefs, her intended 
meaning) rather than about Joan, and this may not be relevant enough to him. How, 
then, do considerations of relevance help Andy understand Barbara’s meaning when 
he is not willing to accept it? We claim that, whether he ends up accepting it or not, 
the hearer interprets the speaker as asserting a proposition that would be relevant 
enough to him provided that he accepted it. 
In other words, hearers must adopt a ‘stance of trust’ in the course of 
interpretation (see Holton, 1994; Origgi, 2005, 2008b). The trust required is less 
miserly than what is required by the principle of charity. It involves a readiness to 
adjust one’s own beliefs to a relevance-guided interpretation of the speaker’s 
meaning, as opposed to adjusting one’s interpretation of the speaker’s meaning to 
one’s own beliefs. On the other hand, it is tentative trust. We claim that interpreting 
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an utterance as if one were going to accept it is not tantamount to actually accepting 
it, not even to accepting it by ‘default’. 
Still, it might be that the stance of trust involved in comprehension causes, or 
contributes to causing, a tendency or bias in favour of actual acceptance of 
communicated information. If so, this might help to explain the results of Gilbert’s 
psychological experiments and the introspective considerations that motivate Reidian 
philosophers to assume (wrongly) that epistemic trust is a default disposition. Note 
that a mere tendency or bias in favour of accepting communicated information would 
not be irrational since, presumably, most communication is honest (and is so, we 
maintain, in at least partly because the audience’s vigilance limits the range of 
situations where dishonesty might be in the communicators’ best interest). 
So, understanding is not believing, but nor is it adopting a sceptical position. 
Comprehension involves adopting a tentative and labile stance of trust; this will lead 
to acceptance only if epistemic vigilance, which is triggered by the same 
communicative acts that trigger comprehension, does not come up with reasons to 
doubt. 
 
4. Vigilance towards the Source 
Communication brings vital benefits, but carries a major risk for the audience of 
being accidentally or intentionally misinformed. Nor is there any failsafe way of 
calibrating one’s trust in communicated information so as to weed out all and only 
the misinformation. Given that the stakes are so high, it is plausible that there has 
been ongoing selective pressure in favour of any available cost-effective means to 
least approximate such sorting. Since there are a variety of considerations relevant to 
the granting or withholding of epistemic trust, we will explore the possibility that 
different abilities for epistemic vigilance may have emerged in biological and cultural 
evolution, each specialising in a particular kind of relevant considerations. 
Factors affecting the acceptance or rejection of a piece of communicated 
information may have to do either with the source of the information – who to believe 
– or with its content – what to believe. In this section and the next, we consider 
epistemic vigilance directed at the source of information. 
Judgements about the trustworthiness of informants may be more or less general 
or contextualised. You may think, ‘Mary is a trustworthy person,’ meaning it both 
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epistemically and morally, and therefore expecting what Mary says to be true, what 
she does to be good, and so on. Or you may trust (or mistrust) someone on a 
particular topic in specific circumstances: ‘You can generally trust Joan on Japanese 
prints, but less so when she is selling one herself.’ Trust can be allocated in both these 
ways, but how do they compare from a normative point of view? 
A reliable informant must meet two conditions: she must be competent, and she 
must be benevolent. That is, she must possess genuine information (as opposed to 
misinformation or no information), and she must intend to share that genuine 
information with her audience (as opposed to making assertions she does not regard 
as true, through either indifference or malevolence). Clearly, the same informant may 
be competent on one topic but not on others, and benevolent towards one audience in 
certain circumstances, but not to another audience or in other circumstances. This 
suggests that trust should be allocated to informants depending on the topic, the 
audience, and the circumstances. However such precise calibration of trust is costly in 
cognitive terms, and, while people are often willing to pay the price, they also 
commonly rely on less costly general impressions of competence, benevolence and 
overall trustworthiness. 
A striking illustration of the tendency to form general judgments of 
trustworthiness on the basis of very limited evidence is provided in a study by  Willis 
and Todorov (2006). Participants were shown pictures of faces, for either a mere 100 
milliseconds or with no time limit, and asked to evaluate the person’s 
trustworthiness, competence, likeability, aggressiveness and attractiveness. Contrary 
to the authors’ expectations, the correlation between judgments with and without 
time limit was not greater for attractiveness (.69) – which is, after all, a property of a 
person’s appearance – than for trustworthiness (.73), while the correlations for 
aggressiveness and competence were a relatively low .52. One might wonder if such 
split-second judgments of trustworthiness have any basis at all, but what this 
experiment strongly suggests is that looking for signs of trustworthiness is one of the 
first things we do when we see a new face (see also Ybarra et al., 2001).  
There is a considerable social psychology literature suggesting that people’s 
behaviour is determined to a significant extent not by their character but by the 
situation (Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Gilbert and Malone, 1995). If so, judging that 
someone is generally trustworthy may be a case of the ‘fundamental attribution error’ 
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(Ross, 1977): that is, the tendency, in explaining or predicting someone’s behaviour, 
to overestimate the role of psychological dispositions and underestimate situational 
factors. But even without appealing to character psychology, it is possible to defend 
the view that some people are more generally trustworthy than others, and are to 
some extent recognisable as such. 
If we continually interact with the same people, misinforming them when it is to 
our own immediate advantage may damage our reputation and end up being costly in 
the long run. Conversely, doing our best to be systematically trustworthy may 
sometimes be costly in the short run, but may be beneficial in the long run. The trade-
off between the short term cost and long term benefits of a policy of trustworthiness 
may differ from person to person, depending, for instance, on the way they discount 
time (Ainslie, 2001), and they may end up following different policies. If such policies 
exist, then general judgments of relative trustworthiness might not be baseless. 
People who opt for a policy of systematic trustworthiness would stand to benefit from 
a reputation for being highly trustworthy. This reputation would be fed by common 
knowledge of their past actions, and might be further advertised by their everyday 
public behaviour and demeanour.  
It is possible to project an image of trustworthiness (whether or not that image is 
itself trustworthy). Is it also possible, conversely, to engage in deceptive behaviour 
such as lying without giving any detectable evidence of the fact? There is a substantial 
literature on lie detection (see Ekman, 2001, for a review), and what it shows, in a 
nutshell, is that detecting lies on the basis of non-verbal behavioural signs is hard 
(Vrij, 2000; Malone and DePaulo, 2001; Bond and DePaulo, 2006), even for people 
who are trained to do so (e.g. DePaulo and Pfeifer, 1986; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 1991; 
Mann, Vrij and Bull, 2004; Vrij, 2004), and even when the liars are far from expert – 
for instance, when they are three-year-old children (Lewis et al., 1989; Talwar and 
Lee, 2002). The ability to lie can be quite advantageous, but only if the liars do not 
give themselves away. Whatever the respective contributions of evolved dispositions 
and acquired skills, liars seem able to keep the behavioural signs of dishonesty to a 
minimum. 
In order to gain a better grasp of the mechanisms for epistemic vigilance towards 
the source, what is most urgently needed is not more empirical work on lie detection 
or general judgments of trustworthiness, but research on how trust and mistrust are 
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calibrated to the situation, the interlocutors and the topic of communication. Here, 
two distinct types of consideration should be taken into account: the communicator’s 
competence on the topic of her assertions, and her motivation for communicating. 
Both competence and honesty are conditions for believability. There is a considerable 
literature with some indirect relevance to the study of epistemic vigilance in ordinary 
communication, for instance in the history and sociology of science (e.g. Shapin, 
1994), the anthropology of law (e.g. Hutchins, 1980; Rosen, 1989), the linguistic 
study of evidentials (e.g. Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Ifantidou, 2001; Aikhenvald, 
2004), or the social psychology of influence and persuasion (e.g. Chaiken, 1980; Petty 
and Cacioppo, 1986). However, much more work needs to be done on epistemic 
vigilance in everyday communication. 
In the next section, we turn to the development of vigilance towards the source in 
childhood, which is not only interesting in its own right, but will also help us separate 
out the various components of epistemic vigilance towards the source of information. 
 
5. The Development of Epistemic Vigilance (and Mindreading) 
There is a growing body of research on the development of children’s epistemic 
vigilance (for reviews, see e.g. Koenig and Harris, 2007; Heyman, 2008; Clément, In 
press; Corriveau and Harris, In press; Nurmsoo et al., In press). This shows that even 
at a very early age, children do not treat all communicated information as equally 
reliable. At 16 months, they notice when a familiar word is inappropriately used 
(Koenig and Echols, 2003). By the age of two, they often attempt to contradict and 
correct assertions that they believe to be false (e.g. Pea, 1982). These studies 
challenge the widespread assumption that young children are simply gullible.  
Do young children have the cognitive resources to allocate trust on the basis of 
relevant evidence about an informant’s trustworthiness? Given the choice, three-year-
olds seem to prefer informants who are both benevolent (Mascaro and Sperber, 
2009; Hamlin and Wynn, 2009) and competent (e.g. Clément et al., 2004). In 
preferring benevolent informants, they take into account not only their own 
observations but also what they have been told about the informant’s moral character 
(Mascaro and Sperber, 2009), and in preferring competent informants, they take past 
accuracy into account (e.g. Clément et al., 2004; Birch et al., 2008; Scofield and 
Behrend, 2008). By the age of four, they not only have appropriate preferences for 
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reliable informants, but also show some grasp of what this reliability involves. For 
instance, they can predict that a dishonest informant will provide false information 
(Couillard and Woodward, 1999), or that an incompetent informant will be less 
reliable (Call and Tomasello, 1999; Lampinen and Smith, 1995; Clément et al., 2004). 
Moreover, they make such predictions despite the fact that unreliable informants 
typically present themselves as benevolent and competent. 
Early epistemic vigilance draws on some of the capacities used in selecting 
partners for cooperation, which include moral evaluation, monitoring of reliability, 
and vigilance towards cheating (e.g. Cosmides and Tooby, 2005, Harris and Núñez, 
1996). Indeed, the exercise of epistemic vigilance not only relies on some of the 
processes involved in selecting cooperative partners, but also contributes to their 
success. In particular, it contributes to the relative reliability of reputation systems, a 
fundamental tool for selecting cooperative partners (e.g. Alexander, 1987; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 1998; Milinski et al., 2002 – but see below). For instance, as four- and five-
year-old children become increasingly vigilant towards deception (Couillard and 
Woodward, 1999; Mascaro and Sperber, 2009) they also become more vigilant 
towards hypocrisy in self-presentation (Peskin, 1996; Heyman and Legare, 2005; 
Mills and Keil, 2005; Gee and Heyman, 2007). 
Epistemic vigilance directed at informants yields a variety of epistemic attitudes 
(acceptance, doubt or rejection, for instance) to the contents communicated by these 
informants. There is some evidence that three-year-old children are aware of 
attitudes such as endorsement or doubt (Fusaro and Harris, 2008), and are also 
aware that assertions can be stronger or weaker (Sabbagh and Baldwin, 2001; Birch 
et al., 2008; Matsui et al., 2009). Children are able to make sense of comments on 
the reliability of what is communicated (e.g. Fusaro and Harris, 2008, Clément et al., 
2004). As a result, they can take advantage of the epistemic judgments of others, and 
enrich their own epistemological understanding and capacity for epistemic vigilance 
in doing so. 
Children also appear to have some capacity to compare the reliability of different 
sources of information. In experiments modelled on Solomon Asch’s famous studies 
on conformity (Asch, 1956), for instance, a majority of three-year-olds trust their own 
perceptions rather than a series of consistently false judgments made by confederates 
of the experimenters (Corriveau and Harris, In press, although see Walker and 
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Andrade, 1996). Children take account of an informant’s access to information (e.g. 
Robinson and Whitcombe, 2003; Robinson et al., 2008; (Nurmsoo and Robinson, 
2009). They also attribute to others lasting dispositions for greater or lesser reliability 
(e.g. Koenig and Harris, 2007; Birch et al., 2009; Corriveau and Harris, 2009), and 
may do this on the basis of an understanding that different people are more or less 
knowledgeable – a component of the child’s naïve psychology which has not been 
investigated in depth (though see Lutz and Keil, 2002). Children’s epistemic vigilance 
thus draws on – and provides evidence for – distinct aspects of their naïve 
epistemology: their understanding that people’s access to information, strength of 
belief, knowledgeability, and commitment to assertions come in degrees. 
When epistemic vigilance is targeted at the risk of deception, it requires an 
understanding not only of a communicator’s epistemic states but also of her 
intentions, including intentions to induce false beliefs in her audience. This calls for 
relatively sophisticated mindreading using higher-order metarepresentations (‘She 
believes that not-P but wants me to believe that P’ combines a first-order attribution 
of belief with a second-order attribution of intention). 
There are interesting parallels between the development of epistemic vigilance 
and evidence from false belief tasks classically used to measure the development of 
mindreading. Rudiments of epistemic vigilance are found in early childhood, 
arguably even in infancy. However, starting at around the age of four, there is a major 
transition in children’s epistemic vigilance towards both dishonesty (Mascaro and 
Sperber, 2009; see also Couillard and Woodward, 1999; Jaswal et al. In press) and 
incompetence (Povinelli and DeBlois, 1992; Call and Tomasello, 1999; Welch-Ross, 
1999; Figueras-Costa and Harris, 2001). At four, children begin to show increased 
attention to the epistemic quality of other people’s beliefs and messages. They 
become much more selective in their trust, and also much more willing and able to 
manipulate the beliefs of others. 
This transition in epistemic vigilance occurs around the age at which children 
succeed in passing standard false belief tasks (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). Until recently, this convergence might have been interpreted on 
the following lines: At around four years of age, as a result of their emerging 
understanding of belief – and false belief in particular – children become increasingly 
aware that others may hold false beliefs, and (at a higher metapresentational level) 
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that others may want them to hold false beliefs. This awareness is the basis for more 
adult-like forms of epistemic vigilance. Whatever the attractions of this line of 
interpretation, it has become less plausible as a result of recent experiments with new 
non-verbal versions of the false belief task adapted for use with infants. These 
experiments suggest that by their second year, children already expect an agent’s 
behaviour to be guided by its beliefs, even when they are false (e.g. Onishi and 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007). If so, the robust 
results of work with the standard false belief task must be reinterpreted, and so must 
the transition that takes place around the age of four. 
Two possible reinterpretations of this transition come readily to mind (and a full 
picture might draw on both). First, the ability to pass standard false belief tasks and 
the improved capacity for epistemic vigilance might have a common cause, for 
instance, a major development in executive function abilities (e.g. Perner and Lang, 
2000; Carlson and Moses, 2001). Second, as a result of their improved capacity for 
epistemic vigilance, children may start paying attention to relevant aspects of false 
belief tasks which are generally missed at an earlier age. As they become increasingly 
aware that others may hold false beliefs (through either epistemic bad luck or 
deception), they get better at taking these false beliefs into account when predicting 
the behaviour of others. Their interest here is not so much that of an observer, but 
rather that of a potential victim of misinformation, a potential perpetrator of 
deception, or a co-operator who prefers knowledgeable partners. 
Current studies of epistemic vigilance thus offer some interesting insights into the 
nature and development of theory of mind abilities. They show that epistemic 
vigilance draws on a variety of cognitive mechanisms with distinct developmental 
trajectories, including the moral sense involved in recognising potential partners for 
cooperation, naïve epistemology, and mindreading. 
 
6. Vigilance towards the Content 
As we have seen in the last two sections, epistemic vigilance can be directed at the 
source of communicated information: Is the communicator competent and honest? It 
can also be directed at the content of communication, which may be more or less 
believable independently of its source. In this section and the next, we consider 
epistemic vigilance directed at the content of communication. 
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Some contents are intrinsically believable even if they come from an 
untrustworthy source. Examples include tautologies, logical proofs, truisms, and 
contents whose truth is sufficiently evidenced by the act of communication itself (e.g. 
saying, ‘Je suis capable de dire quelques mots en français’). Other contents are 
intrinsically unbelievable even if they come from a trustworthy source. Examples 
include logical contradictions, blatant falsehoods, and contents whose falsity is 
sufficiently evidenced by the act of communication itself (e.g. saying, ‘I am mute’). 
In most cases, however, epistemic vigilance directed at communicated content 
must rely on more than just its inherent logical properties, indisputable background 
knowledge, or the self-confirming or -disconfirming nature of some utterances. The 
believability of newly communicated information must be assessed relative to 
background beliefs which are themselves open to revision. Obviously, new 
information cannot be assessed relative to the whole of one’s ‘mental encyclopaedia’. 
To keep processing time and costs within manageable limits, only a very small subset 
of that encyclopaedia, closely related to the new piece of information, can be brought 
to bear on its assessment. Indeed, the systematic activation of even a limited subset of 
background information solely for the purpose of assessing the believability of 
communicated content would still be quite costly in processing terms. We will argue 
that such ad hoc activation is unnecessary. 
According to relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 2005; Carston, 2002; 
Wilson and Sperber, 2004), the comprehension process itself involves the automatic 
activation of background information in the context of which the utterance may be 
interpreted as relevant. Here, the processing costs tend to be proportionate to the 
cognitive benefits derived. We claim that this same background information which is 
used in the pursuit of relevance can also yield an imperfect but cost-effective 
epistemic assessment. Moreover, as we will now show, the search for relevance 
involves inferential steps which provide a basis for this assessment. 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) distinguish three types of contextual effect through 
which a piece of new information can achieve relevance in a context of existing 
beliefs. (i) When new information and contextual beliefs are taken together as 
premises, they may yield ‘contextual implications’ (implications derivable from 
neither the context nor the new information alone) which are accepted as new beliefs. 
(ii) The individual’s confidence in contextually activated beliefs may be raised or 
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lowered in the light of new information. (iii) New information may contradict 
contextually activated beliefs and lead to their revision. All three types of contextual 
effect (acceptance of contextually implied new beliefs, modification of strength of 
beliefs, and revision of beliefs) tend to contribute to an improvement in the 
individual’s knowledge. 
What happens when the result of processing some new piece of information in a 
context of existing beliefs is a contradiction? When the new information was acquired 
through perception, it is quite generally sound to trust one’s own perceptions more 
than one’s memory and to update one’s beliefs accordingly. You believed Joan was in 
the garden; you hear her talking in the living room. You automatically update your 
belief about Joan’s whereabouts. Presumably, such automatic updating is the only 
form of belief revision engaged in by non-human animals. 
When the new information was communicated, on the other hand, there are three 
possibilities to consider. (i) If the source is not regarded as reliable, the new 
information can simply be rejected as untrue, and therefore irrelevant: for instance, a 
drunk in the street tells you that there is a white elephant around the corner. (ii) If the 
source is regarded as quite authoritative and the background beliefs which conflict 
with what the source has told us are not held with much conviction, these beliefs can 
be directly corrected: for instance, looking at Gil, you had thought he was in his early 
twenties, but he tells you that he is 29 years old. You accept this as true and relevant – 
relevant in the first place because it allows you to correct your mistaken beliefs. (iii) If 
you are confident about both the source and your own beliefs, then some belief 
revision is unavoidable. You must revise either your background beliefs or your belief 
that the source is reliable, but it is not immediately clear which. For instance, it 
seemed to you that Gil was in his early twenties; Lucy tells you that he must be in his 
early thirties. Should you should stick to your own estimate or trust Lucy’s? 
Things are not so different when the result of processing information 
communicated by a trusted source is not a logical inconsistency but an empirical 
incoherence: that is, when the new information is incompatible with some of our 
background beliefs, given other more entrenched background beliefs. For instance, 
you believed that Gil was a doctor; Lucy tells you that he is only 22 years old. You 
have the well entrenched belief that becoming a doctor takes many years of study, so 
that it is almost impossible to be a doctor by the age of 22. Hence, you should either 
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disbelieve Lucy or give up the belief that Gil is a doctor. In order to preserve 
coherence, you must reduce either your confidence in the source or your confidence 
in your less entrenched beliefs. 
The role of coherence checking in belief revision has been highlighted by 
philosophers such as Gilbert Harman (1986) and Paul Thagard (2002). Here, though, 
we see coherence checking not as a general epistemic procedure for belief revision, 
but as a mechanism for epistemic vigilance directed at communicated content, which 
takes advantage of the limited background information activated by the 
comprehension process itself.  
If only for reasons of efficiency, one might expect the type of coherence checking 
used in epistemic vigilance to involve no more than the minimal revisions needed to 
re-establish coherence. In some cases, coherence is more easily restored by 
distrusting the source, and in others by revisiting some of one’s own background 
beliefs. Unless one option dominates the competition to the point of inhibiting 
awareness of the alternatives, it takes a typically conscious decision to resolve the 
issue. Making such a decision involves engaging in some higher order or 
metapreresentational thinking about one’s own beliefs. 
What we are suggesting is that the search for a relevant interpretation, which is 
part and parcel of the comprehension process, automatically involves the making of 
inferences which may turn up inconsistencies or incoherences relevant to epistemic 
assessment. When such inconsistencies or incoherences occur, they trigger a 
procedure wholly dedicated to such assessment. Still, comprehension, the search for 
relevance, and epistemic assessment are interconnected aspects of a single overall 
process whose goal is to make the best of communicated information. 
 
7. Epistemic Vigilance and Reasoning 
Now consider things from the communicator’s point of view. Suppose she suspects 
that her addressee is unlikely to accept what she says purely on trust, but will 
probably exercise some epistemic vigilance and check how far her claim coheres with 
his own beliefs. The addressee’s active vigilance stands in the way of the 
communicator’s achieving her goal. Still, from the communicator’s point of view, a 
vigilant addressee is better than one who rejects her testimony outright. And indeed, 
the addressee’s reliance on coherence as a criterion for accepting or rejecting her 
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claim may offer the communicator an opportunity to get past his defences and 
convince him after all.  
We have suggested that coherence checking takes place against the narrow context 
of beliefs used in the search for a relevant interpretation of the utterance. But the 
addressee may have other less highly activated beliefs which would have weighed in 
favour of the information he is reluctant to accept, if he had been able to take them 
into account. In that case, it may be worth the communicator’s while to remind the 
addressee of these background beliefs, thus increasing the acceptability of her claim. 
Or there may be other information that the addressee would accept on trust from the 
communicator, which would cohere well with her claim and thus make it more 
acceptable. 
To illustrate, we will adapt a famous example from Grice (1975/1989, p. 32). Andy 
and Barbara are in Boston, gossiping about their friend Steve: 
 
Andy: Steve doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days 
Barbara: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately 
 
Barbara believes that Steve has a new girlfriend, but feels that if she were simply to 
say so, Andy, who has just expressed doubt on the matter, would disagree. Still, she 
has noticed that Steve has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately, and regards 
this as evidence that Steve has a girlfriend there. Andy might also have noticed these 
visits, and if not, he is likely to accept Barbara’s word for it. Once he takes these visits 
into account, the conclusion that Steve might have a girlfriend may become much 
more acceptable to him. 
Barbara is making no secret of the fact that she wants Andy to accept this 
conclusion. On the contrary, her assertion that Steve has been paying a lot of visits to 
New York will only satisfy Andy’s expectations of relevance (or be cooperative in 
Grice’s sense) to the extent that it is understood as implicating that Steve might have 
a girlfriend despite Andy’s doubts. Although Andy recognises this implicature as part 
of Barbara’s intended meaning, he may not accept it. What Barbara is relying on in 
order to convince him is not his ability to understand her utterance but his ability to 
grasp the force of the argument whose premises include her explicit statement, 
together with other pieces of background knowledge (about Steve’s likely reasons for 
visiting New York regularly), and whose conclusion is her implicature.  
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In another, slightly different scenario, Andy himself remarks that Steve has been 
paying a lot of visits to New York lately; but failing to see the connection, he adds, ‘He 
doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.’ In that case, Barbara may highlight the 
connection in order to help him come to the intended conclusion, saying: ‘If he goes 
to New York, it may be to see a girlfriend’, or ‘If he had a girlfriend in New York, that 
would explain his visits.’ Or she might simply repeat Andy’s comment, but with a 
different emphasis: ‘He doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days, but he has been 
paying a lot of visits to New York lately.’ Logical connectives such as ‘if’ and discourse 
connectives such as ‘but’, which suggest directions for inference, are used by the 
communicator to help the addressee arrive at the intended conclusion (Blakemore, 
1987, 2002). 
In both scenarios, when Barbara expresses herself as she does and Andy sees the 
force of her implicit argument, they are making use of an inferential mechanism 
which is sensitive to logical and evidential relationships among propositions, and 
which recognises, more specifically, that some function as premises and others as 
conclusions. What Barbara conveys, and what Andy is likely to recognise, is that it 
would be incoherent to accept the premises and reject the conclusion.  
Argumentation, in either the simple and largely implicit form illustrated in the 
above scenarios or in more complex and more explicit forms, is a product of 
reasoning.4 In a series of papers (Mercier and Sperber, 2009; Sperber and Mercier, In 
press; Sperber, 2001; Mercier and Sperber, Forthcoming) Hugo Mercier and Dan 
Sperber have argued that reasoning is a tool for epistemic vigilance, and for 
communication with vigilant addressees. Its main function is to enable 
communicators to produce arguments designed to convince others, and addressees to 
evaluate arguments so as to be convinced only when appropriate. 
Classically, reasoning is seen as a tool for individual cognition, which is supposed 
to help people overcome the limits of intuition, acquire better grounded beliefs, 
                                                 
4 The term ‘reasoning’ is sometimes used in a broad sense as a synonym of 
‘inference’ (in particular in developmental and comparative psychology). Here we use 
‘reasoning’ in its more frequent sense to refer to a form of inference which involves 
attending to the reasons for accepting some conclusion. Reasoning, so understood, 
involves reflection, and contrasts with intuitive forms of inference where we arrive at 
a conclusion without attending to reasons for accepting it. A similar contrast between 
intuitive and reflective forms of inference has been much discussed under the 
heading of ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning (see, for instance, Evans and Frankish, 
2009). 
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particularly in areas beyond the reach of perception and spontaneous inference, and 
make good decisions (Evans and Over, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich, 2004). 
This common view is not easy to square with the massive evidence that human 
reasoning is not so good at fulfilling this alleged function. Ordinary reasoning fails to 
solve trivial logical problems (Evans, 2002) or override transparently flawed 
intuitions (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994). It often leads us towards bad decisions 
(Shafir et al., 1993; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) and poor epistemic outcomes (Kunda, 
1990). By contrast, intuition has a good track record for efficiently performing very 
complex computations (e.g. (Trommershauser et al., 2008; Balci et al., 2009). 
Human reasoning, with its blatant shortcomings and relatively high operating costs, 
is not properly explained by its alleged function as a tool for individual cognition. 
Predictions derived from the ‘argumentative theory of reasoning’, by contrast, are 
supported by a wealth of evidence from different fields in psychology (Mercier, 
submitted-b, submitted-a, submitted-c; Mercier and Landemore, submitted; Mercier 
and Sperber, submitted). To give just one example, the argumentative theory makes a 
prediction which sets it apart from other approaches and which is of particular 
relevance to the study of epistemic vigilance. If the function of reasoning is to find 
arguments to convince others, then the arguments it comes up with should support 
the communicator’s position, and, in appropriate circumstances, should undermine 
the interlocutor’s position. In other words, reasoning should exhibit a strong 
confirmation bias. And indeed, this bias towards ‘seeking or interpreting of evidence 
in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand’ 
(Nickerson, 1998 p.175) has been evidenced in countless psychology experiments and 
observations in natural settings (see Nickerson, 1998 for review). For classical 
accounts of reasoning, it is puzzling that such a bias should be so robust and 
prevalent – or indeed that it should exist at all – and attempts have been made to 
explain it away by appealing to motivational or cognitive limitations. But there are 
several arguments against these attempted explanations. In the first place, the 
confirmation bias seems to be restricted to reasoning, and not to occur in intuitive 
judgments (Mercier and Sperber, Forthcoming). In the second place, attempts to 
overcome these alleged cognitive or motivational problems make little or no 
difference (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Willingham, 2008). This suggests that the 
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confirmation bias is not a flaw in reasoning, but rather a feature that is to be 
expected in a mechanism designed to persuade others by use of arguments. 
Interestingly, the confirmation bias need not lead to poor performance from a 
logical normative point of view. When people with different viewpoints share a 
genuine interest in reaching the right conclusion, the confirmation bias makes it 
possible to arrive at an efficient division of cognitive labour. Each individual looks 
only for reasons to support their own position, while exercising vigilance towards the 
arguments proposed by others and evaluating them carefully. This requires much less 
work than having to search exhaustively for the pros and cons of every position 
present in the group. By contrast, when the confirmation bias is not held in check by 
others with dissenting opinions, reasoning becomes epistemically hazardous, and 
may lead individuals to be over-confident of their own beliefs (Koriat et al., 1980), or 
to adopt stronger version of those beliefs (Tesser, 1978). In group discussions where 
all the participants share the same viewpoint and are arguing not so much against 
each other as against absent opponents, such polarization is common and can lead to 
fanaticism (Sunstein, 2002). 
We are not claiming that reasoning takes place only in a communicative context. 
It clearly occurs in solitary thinking, and plays an important role in belief revision. 
We would like to speculate, however, that reasoning in non-communicative contexts 
is an extension of a basic component of the capacity for epistemic vigilance towards 
communicated information, and that it typically involves an anticipatory or 
imaginative communicative framing. On this view, the solitary thinker is in fact 
considering claims she might be presented with, or that she might want to convince 
others to accept, or engaging in a dialogue with herself where she alternates between 
different points of view. Experimental evidence might help confirm or disconfirm 
such speculation: for instance, we predict that encouraging or inhibiting such mental 
framing would facilitate or hamper reasoning. 
 
8. Epistemic vigilance on a population scale 
What we have considered so far is the filtering role that epistemic vigilance plays in 
the flow of information in face to face interaction. In this section, we turn to the flow 
of information on a population scale, as for instance in the emergence of good or bad 
reputations or the propagation of religious beliefs. Information of this type that 
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spreads in a population through social transmission is known as ‘cultural 
information’. The very social success which is almost a defining feature of cultural 
information might suggest that (except in cases of cultural conflict) it is uncritically 
accepted. We will argue, however, that here too epistemic vigilance is at work, but 
that it needs appropriate cultural and institutional development to meet some of the 
epistemic challenges presented by cultural information. 
No act of communication among humans, even if it is only of local relevance to the 
interlocutors at the time, is ever totally disconnected from the flow of information in 
the whole social group. Human communication always carries cultural features. It 
may do so explicitly, as when Andy says to Barbara, ‘Champagne is expensive!’, 
reminding her of an assumption which is culturally shared in their milieu, and which 
he sees as relevant in the circumstances. It may do so implicitly, as when Andy says to 
Barbara in another of our examples, ‘Steve doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these 
days.’ Although Andy’s remark has quite limited and local relevance, it implicates 
culturally shared assumptions about what is to be expected of a bachelor like Steve, 
without which his remark would not be relevant in the intended way. Many cultural 
assumptions are distributed in this way, not so much – or, in some cases, not at all – 
by being directly asserted, but by being used as implicit premises in a vast number of 
communicative acts such as Andy’s utterance. 
Is epistemic vigilance exercised in the case of culturally transmitted contents, and 
if so, how? When contents of this type are conveyed, either explicitly or implicitly, 
communicators use their own individual authority not so much to endorse the 
content as to vouch for its status as a commonly accepted cultural assumption. When 
Andy says that champagne is expensive, or implies that it would be normal for Steve 
to have a girlfriend, he conveys that these are accepted views in his and Barbara’s 
milieu. If Barbara disagrees, her disagreement is not just with Andy, but with this 
accepted view. 
If an idea is generally accepted by the people you interact with, isn’t this a good 
reason for you to accept it too? It may be a modest and prudent policy to go along 
with the people one interacts with, and to accept the ideas they accept. Anything else 
may compromise one’s cultural competence and social acceptability. For all we know, 
it may be quite common for members of a cultural group to accept what they take to 
be ‘accepted views’ in this pragmatic sense, without making any strong or clear 
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epistemic commitment to their content (Sperber, 1975, Sperber, 1985; Boyer 1990; 
Bloch 1998). From an epistemological point of view, the fact that an idea is widely 
shared is not a good reason to accept it unless these people have come to hold it 
independently of one another. Only in those circumstances will every individual who 
accepts this idea add to our own epistemological reasons for accepting it too. Quite 
often, however, people who accept (in an epistemological sense) culturally shared 
ideas have no independent reasons for doing so. 
Often, information spreads through a group from a single source, and is accepted 
by people along the chains of transmission because they trust the source rather than 
because of any evidence or arguments for the content. If so, the crucial consideration 
should be the trustworthiness of the original source. If each person who passes on the 
information has good independent reasons for trusting the source, this should give 
people further along the chain good reasons for also trusting the source, and thus for 
accepting the content originally conveyed. However, people’s reasons for trusting the 
source are in general no more independent of one another than their reasons for 
accepting the content. 
Even if we make the strong assumption that each individual along the chain of 
transmission from the source to ourselves had good reasons for trusting the previous 
individual in the chain, these reasons can never be error-proof; hence, our own 
confidence in the original source should diminish as the length of the chain increases. 
Moreover, it is quite common for a piece of information with no clearly identified 
source to be accepted and transmitted purely on the ground that it is widely accepted 
and transmitted – an obvious circularity. Add to all this the fact that when an idea 
propagates through a population, its content tends to alter in the process without the 
propagators being aware of these alterations (as with nearly all rumours and 
traditions – see Sperber, 1996). In these cases, even if there were good reason to 
regard the original source as reliable, this would provide no serious support for the 
idea as currently formulated.  
It might seem, then, that people are simply willing, or even eager, to accept 
culturally transmitted information without exercising ordinary epistemic vigilance 
towards it. Boyd, Richerson and Henrich have argued that there is an evolved 
conformist bias in favour of adopting the behaviour and attitudes of the majority of 
members of one’s community (e.g. (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Henrich and Boyd, 
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1998). Csibra and Gergely (2009) have argued that people in general, and children in 
particular, are eager to acquire cultural information, and that this may bias them 
towards interpreting (and even over-interpreting) communicated information as 
having cultural relevance, and also towards accepting it. An alternative (or perhaps 
complementary) hypothesis is that people do exercise some degree of epistemic 
vigilance towards all communicated information, whether local or cultural, but that 
their vigilance is directed primarily at information originating in face to face 
interaction, and not at information propagated on a larger scale. For instance, people 
may be disposed to pay attention to the problems raised by the non-independence of 
testimonies, or by discrepancies in their contents, when they are blatantly obvious, as 
they often are when they occur in face to face interaction, but not otherwise. On a 
population scale, these problems can remain unnoticed although, on reflection, they 
are likely to be pervasive. All kinds of beliefs widely shared in the community may 
propagate throughout a culture by appealing to individual trust in converging 
testimonies. The trust is not blind, but the epistemic vigilance which should buttress 
it is short-sighted. 
Of particular relevance here are two kinds of belief which are typically cultural: 
reputations, and beliefs which are only partly understood, and whose content is 
mysterious. There is a vast literature on reputation in general (e.g.. Tirole, 1996; 
Morris, 1999) and on its relevance to cooperation and to social epistemology (e.g. 
Henrich et al., 2006; Mathew and Boyd, 2009).  
The term ‘reputation’ is generally understood as a positive or negative opinion, for 
instance, the opinion that Lisa is generous or that John is a liar, which has become 
widely accepted in a group through repeated transmission. When an individual 
belongs to a relatively small group in which many people have direct experience of 
her qualities and shortcomings, and where they can express and compare their 
opinions with some freedom (for instance by gossiping), then her actual behaviour 
may play an important role in reinforcing or compromising her reputation. Of course, 
gossips may themselves be incompetent or not quite honest, but ordinary epistemic 
vigilance is relevant to assessing both gossipers and gossip. However, many 
reputations are spread on a larger scale, by people with no knowledge relevant to 
their direct assessment. When an addressee has to decide whether or not to believe an 
unfamiliar source of information, she may have no other basis for her decision than 
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her knowledge of the source’s reputation, which she is unable to assess herself, and 
which she is likely to accept for want of a better choice. All too often, reputations are 
examples of ideas which are accepted and transmitted purely on the ground that they 
are widely accepted and transmitted. 
As noted above, the content of socially transmitted beliefs is typically modified in 
the course of transmission. One of the ways in which reputations get transformed is 
by becoming inflated well beyond the level found in typical opinions arrived at 
individually. When epistemic authorities – religious leaders, gurus, maîtres à penser 
– achieve such inflated reputations, people who are then inclined to defer more to 
them than to any source whose reliability they have directly assessed may find 
themselves in the following predicament: If they were to check the pronouncements 
of these sources (for instance, ‘Mary was and remained a virgin when she gave birth’ 
or Lacan’s ‘There is no such thing as a sexual relationship’) for coherence with their 
existing beliefs, they would reject them. But this would in turn bring into question 
their acceptance of the authority of the source. A common solution to this 
predicament is to engage in a variant of Davidsonian ‘charitable interpretation’, and 
to ‘optimize agreement’ not by providing a clear and acceptable interpretation of 
these pronouncements, but by deferring to the authorities (or their authorised 
interpreters) for the proper interpretation, and thus accepting a half-understood or 
‘semi-propositional’ idea (Sperber, 1985; 1997; In press). Most religious beliefs are 
typical examples of beliefs of this kind, whose content is in part mysterious to the 
believers themselves (Bloch, 1998; Boyer 2001). 
So far, the picture we have sketched of epistemic vigilance on a population scale is 
somewhat grim. Mechanisms for epistemic vigilance are not geared to filtering 
information transmitted on such a large scale. Even if we are right to claim that these 
mechanisms exist, they do not prevent mistaken ideas, undeserved reputations and 
empty creeds from invading whole populations. However, we did note that it is 
important not to jump from the fact that people are seriously, even passionately, 
committed to certain ideas, and expect others to be similarly committed, to the 
conclusion that the commitment involved is clearly epistemic. It may be that the 
content of the ideas matters less to you than who you share them with, since they may 
help define group identities. When what matters is the sharing, it may be that 
contents which are unproblematically open to epistemic evaluation would raise 
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objections within the relevant social group, or would be too easily shared beyond that 
group. So, semi-propositional contents which can be unproblematically accepted by 
just the relevant group may have a cultural success which is negatively correlated with 
their epistemic value.  
So far, we have considered only the effects of ordinary individual vigilance 
exercised on a population scale. However, epistemic vigilance can also take on 
institutional form. Some of these institutions help to protect established authorities 
or impose a dogma, and are therefore detrimental to true epistemological goals. 
Strictly speaking, such forms of hegemonic or dogmatic vigilance are not epistemic. 
By contrast, other institutional forms of genuinely epistemic vigilance may provide 
better epistemic filtering than the mere cumulative effect of spontaneous vigilance 
exercised by individuals. 
In a number of domains, there are institutional procedures for evaluating the 
competence of individuals, making these evaluations public through some form of 
certification, and sanctioning false claims to being so certified. Medical doctors, 
professors, judges, surveyors, accountants, priests, and so on are generally believed to 
be experts in their field because they have shown strong evidence of their expertise to 
experts who are even more qualified. Of course, these procedures may be inadequate 
or corrupt, and the domain may itself be riddled with errors; but still, such 
procedures provide clear and easily accessible evidence of an individual’s expertise. 
In analysing how information is assessed, filtered, and, in the process, 
transformed on the population scale, it is just as important to study vigilance towards 
the content as to study vigilance towards the source. We suggested above that 
vigilance towards the content is typically exercised through debate and argument, and 
may give rise to a kind of spontaneous division of cognitive labour. This division of 
labour can itself be culturally organized and take various institutional forms. 
Examples include judicial institutions, where a number of rules and procedures are 
designed to establish the facts of the matter through examination of the evidence, 
questioning of witnesses, and debates between the parties, for instance. The 
institutional organisation of epistemic vigilance is nowhere more obvious than in the 
sciences, where observational or theoretical claims are critically assessed via social 
processes such as laboratory discussion, workshops, conferences, and peer review in 
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journals. The reliability of a journal is itself assessed through rankings, and so on 
(Goldman, 1999). 
Social mechanisms for vigilance towards the source and vigilance towards the 
content interact in many ways. In judicial proceedings, for instance, the reputation of 
the witness is scrutinised in order to strengthen or weaken her testimony. In the 
sciences, peer review is meant to be purely content-oriented, but is influenced all too 
often by the authors’ prior reputation (although blind reviewing is supposed to 
suppress this influence), and the outcome of the reviewing process in turn affects the 
authors’ reputation. Certification of expertise, as in the granting of a PhD, generally 
involves multiple complex assessments from teachers and examiners, who engage in 
discussion with the candidate and among themselves; these assessments are 
compiled by educational institutions which eventually deliver a reputation label, 
‘PhD’, for public consumption.  
Here we can do no more than point to a few of the issues raised by social 
mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. Our main aim in doing so is to suggest that, to a 
significant extent, these social mechanisms are articulations of psychological 
mechanisms linked through extended chains of communication, and, in some cases 
through institutional patterning (Sperber, 1996). In these population scale 
articulations, psychological mechanisms combine with cognitive artefacts (e.g., 
measuring instruments), techniques (e.g., statistical tests of confidence), and 
procedures (e.g., for cross-examination) to yield distributed epistemic assessment 
systems (Heintz, 2006) which should be seen as a special kind of distributed 
cognitive system (Hutchins, 1996). 
The way in which people rely on distributed assessment systems poses a new 
version of Reid’s and Hume’s problem of how to justify our trust in tesminony. This is 
particularly true in the case of the new assessment systems without which we would 
be unable to use the Web at all. Google is a salient case in point. Google is not only a 
search engine, but is also used as an epistemic assessment engine. It implicitly 
represents, in the form of a ranked list, the relative epistemic values of Web 
documents found in a search. The higher the rank of a document, the more likely it is 
to contain relevant and reliable information. One way of producing such a ranking 
involves calculating the number of links to a given Web document from other Web 
sites, and weighting this number according to the relative importance of these sites 
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(which is itself calculated based on the number of links to them from still other sites). 
The idea behind this process is that linking to a document is an implicit judgement of 
its worth. The process compiles these judgements into an accessible indication: its 
rank on a search results page.  
Why, then, do people rely on a search engine such as Google even though they 
know little or nothing about how its results pages are produced? And how far are they 
justified in doing so? Note, first, that our reliance is not entirely blind: This cognitive 
technology, like any other technology, is adopted on the basis of its observed success. 
Moreover, our reliance is tentative: We are willing to look first at highly ranked pages 
and to assume that there are good reasons why they are so highly ranked. But don’t 
we then exercise some fairly standard epistemic vigilance towards the information we 
are presented with? The work and ideas evoked in this article should be relevant to an 
empirical investigation of such novel issues. 
 
9. Concluding remark 
Our aim in this paper has been to give some substance to the claim that humans have 
a suite of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance. To this end, we have surveyed 
issues, research and theories in different domains of philosophy, linguistics, cognitive 
psychology and the social sciences. We do not expect our readers to have accepted all 
our assumptions, several of which we ourselves view as rather speculative. What we 
do hope is to have a made a good case for the recognition of epistemic vigilance as an 
important aspect of human interaction. Just like communication, to which it is 
essentially linked, epistemic vigilance relies on individual mental mechanisms which 
are articulated across individuals and populations into social mechanisms. Some of 
these mechanisms are targeted at the source of information, others at its content. 
Seeing these diverse mechanisms as all contributing to one and the same function of 
epistemic vigilance may be a source of insight in the study of each one of them.  
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